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Mobility Lessons from Gautreaux and Moving to Opportunity
Greg J. Duncan & Anita Zuberi
Research on the impacts of the Gautreaux residential mobility program was first 
conducted nearly two decades ago.1  The purpose of this article is to provide an update on 
Gautreaux lessons based on a new wave of Gautreaux research.  The recent research provides a 
much longer-run picture of residential and personal outcomes, and draws its data from 
administrative records rather than surveys.  We also provide some comparison between results 
from Gautreaux and those from its sister program, Moving to Opportunity (MTO).  We conclude 
with some thoughts about policy implications based not only on residential mobility research but 
also from evaluations of more general work-support programs that have been conducted in the 
past decade.
Gautreaux One is the name we give to the original Gautreaux program that moved 
thousands of Chicago families who were in public housing or on waiting lists for public housing 
to other neighborhoods in and around Chicago.  It began in 1976 and ended in the late 1990s, 
with the bulk of its moves occurring in the 1980s (Figure 1). 
The Moving to Opportunity experiment followed on the heels of Gautreaux One and was 
inspired by it.  It was run by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in five 
cities, including Chicago, from the mid- to late-1990’s.  Similar to Gautreaux One, it provided 
                                                
1 For a comprehensive review of the history of the Gautreaux lawsuit, the implementation of the program, and early 
research results, see generally LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ & JAMES ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND COLOR 
LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA (2000).  See also James E. Rosenbaum & Julie E. Kaufman, 
The Education and Employment of Low-Income African-American Youth in White Suburbs, 14 EDUC. EVALUATION 
& POL’Y ANALYSIS 229 (1992) and Susan J. Popkin, James E. Rosenbaum & Pamela M. Meaden, Labor Market 
Experiences of Low-Income Black Women in Middle-Class Suburbs: Evidence from a Survey of Gautreaux Program 
Participants, 12 J. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 556, 573 (1993) for specific details on early employment and 
educational outcomes, respectively. 
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thousands of families in these five metropolitan areas with an opportunity to move to more 
affluent neighborhoods; however, MTO operated over a much shorter period of time than 
Gautreaux One.  Finally, a new round of the Gautreaux program began in 2002.  Thus far, it has 
moved hundreds, rather than thousands, of families, but not enough time has elapsed for us to be 
able to assess long-term outcomes in the program we call Gautreaux Two.  
One important way in which the Gautreaux program designs differ from MTO’s is that 
the Gautreaux programs were part of a legal settlement involving racial discrimination and 
designed to provide families living in highly segregated neighborhoods of concentrated poverty 
in Chicago the opportunity to move to much better neighborhoods, where “much better” was 
defined as more racially integrated.2  In contrast, Moving to Opportunity targeted only class.3  It 
provided families with opportunities to move to more affluent neighborhoods, defined as those 
with poverty rates under 10 percent, but attached no racial criteria whatsoever to the destination 
neighborhoods.4  In fact, most MTO families moved to highly segregated, if more affluent, 
neighborhoods.5  
Program evaluation.  In evaluating the three programs, it is crucial to understand the 
nature of the comparisons that are being made.  The potential impact of a housing mobility 
program can be defined by the difference between how a family provided with the program’s 
                                                
2 The Gautreaux One program was designed to place families in neighborhoods with less than 30% Black residents.  
See RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 25.  In 1981, program rules changed so that families could move 
to neighborhoods with more than 30% Black residents if the neighborhoods were deemed to be revitalizing.  Id. at 
40.  The Gautreaux Two program incorporated both racial and poverty criteria for its moves; participants were 
placed in neighborhoods with less than 23.49% of the residents living in poverty and less than 30 percent Black 
residents.  See Jennifer Pashup et al, Participation in a Residential Mobility Program from the Client’s Perspective: 
Findings from Gautreaux Two, 16 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 361, 366 (2006).
3 See LARRY ORR ET AL., DEPT. HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., Executive Summary of MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY: INTERIM 
IMPACTS EVALUATION v (2003), http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/MTOFullReport.pdf. 
4 Id. at ii. 
5 Id. at viii.
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mobility opportunities fared relative to what would have happened to that family had it not been 
given those opportunities.  Since MTO’s evaluation design is based on random assignment, it is 
well-suited for estimating program impacts.  When families living in public housing in MTO’s 
five cities were recruited for the program, they were told that they would be in a lottery in which 
they had a one-in-three chance of not being able to move in conjunction with the program.6  
Essentially, a coin was then flipped, determining which families became eligible for the program 
and which did not.  As a result, the fortunes of MTO control group families can be tracked 
alongside those of families in the program group.
There is no control group in the Gautreaux One program; research studies have only been 
able to study subgroups of families, all of whom moved in conjunction with the program.  While 
the Gautreaux Two study follows families who both did and did not take up the program’s offer 
of mobility assistance, the two groups were formed by self-selection rather than random 
assignment.  The study designs of Gautreaux One and Two thus limit their capacity to answer the 
important policy impact question, although both are useful in addressing questions regarding 
program design and the role of the characteristics of destination neighborhoods.
Although control-group comparisons are not possible with Gautreaux One, a great deal of 
research has come out of the program.7  The best-known research studies compare the roughly 
half of program families placed in neighborhoods in the city of Chicago with the rest of the 
                                                
6 A random lottery assigned MTO participants into three groups: Experimental, Section 8, and Control.  The 
experimental group received a housing voucher which could only be used to move into a low-poverty census tract 
(i.e., less than 10 percent poverty).  Counseling services were also available to assist the experimental group in 
finding a unit.  In contrast, the Section 8 group received a housing voucher which could be used in any census tract 
regardless of poverty level, but they did not receive any counseling to help them.  The control group did not receive 
a housing voucher or counseling through MTO, however they could move using other resources available to them 
outside of the program. For more information see ORR ET AL, supra note 3, at ii-iv.
7 Much of this research is summarized in RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 1.
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families, all of whom were placed in Chicago’s suburbs.8  More recent research has expanded 
these comparisons by examining families according to the poverty rates, racial characteristics 
and other features of their placement neighborhoods.9  As noted above, although counselors in 
Gautreaux One strove to place families in low-poverty, racially-integrated neighborhoods, there 
were in fact periods during its operation when it was very difficult to find housing in 
neighborhoods that met these criteria.  About one-fifth of the families in Gautreaux One were 
placed in high poverty, highly segregated neighborhoods.10  The research compares the fortunes 
of the one-fifth of families placed in these neighborhoods with the four-fifths placed in more 
affluent and less segregated neighborhoods, some but not all of which were in suburban 
communities.
Long-run Gautreaux results.  What have we learned from the more recent look at 
Gautreaux One?  Its most stunning success is revealed by tracking families’ addresses in the late 
1990s, up to 22 years after their original moves.  With two-thirds of Gautreaux One families 
placed in the suburbs still residing in the suburbs, there is great persistence in the residential 
successes of the families that moved as part of the program.11  Even more impressive is the 
program’s intergenerational residential successes: the children placed in the suburbs with their 
mothers, but old enough to be living on their own by the late 1990s, continue to reside in 
                                                
8 See James E. Rosenbaum & Susan J. Popkin, Employment and Earnings of Low-Income Blacks Who Move to 
Middle-Class Suburbs, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 342, 356 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991); 
Rosenbaum & Kaufman, supra note 1; James E. Rosenbaum, Black Pioneers—Do Their Moves to the Suburbs 
Increase Economic Opportunity for Mothers and Children?, 2 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 1179 (1994); James E. 
Rosenbaum, Changing the Geography of Opportunity by Expanding Residential Choice: Lessons from the 
Gautreaux Program, 6 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 231 (1995).
9 See Micere Keels et al,  Fifteen Years Later: Can Residential Mobility Programs Provide a Long-Term Escape 
from Neighborhood Segregation, Crime, and Poverty?, 42 DEMOGRAPHY 51 (2005); Ruby Mendenhall et al, 
Neighborhood Resources, Racial Segregation, and Economic Mobility: Results from the Gautreaux Program, SOC.
SCI. RES. (forthcoming 2006).
10 Mendenhall et al, supra note 9 (manuscript at 6, on file with the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy).
11 Keels et al, supra note 9, at 60. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 1, NO. 1
114
neighborhoods that have lower poverty rates, have higher rates of educational attainment and are 
more integrated than the ones they originally lived in.12  Figures 2 and 3 provide a more detailed 
look at the residential fortunes of Gautreaux One mothers and children.  On average, these 
families came from very poor neighborhoods, with census tract poverty rates averaging 40%, the 
lower boundary commonly used to define concentrated-poverty or “ghetto” neighborhoods.13
On average, Gautreaux One cut these neighborhood poverty rates by more than half – to 
17%.14  As of the late 1990s, both the mothers and the children were living in communities with 
poverty rates that were similar to their placement addresses – 16% for mothers15 and 18% for 
their grown children.16  The persistence of the residential success of families moving in 
conjunction with the Gautreaux One program is indeed striking.  Looking to the racial 
composition of the neighborhoods (Figure 3), Gautreaux One families began in highly 
segregated settings: on average 87% of their neighbors in their origin communities were African 
American.  The program placed its families in communities that reduced this percentage by two-
thirds, to 30% African American.17  In contrast to rates of neighborhood poverty, the subsequent 
moves of Gautreaux One families were to somewhat different neighborhoods – on average, they 
contained a fairly even balance of African Americans and individuals from other races.18  Almost 
                                                
12 MICERE KEELS, THE GAUTREAUX RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY PROGRAM: CHILDREN’S SECOND GENERATION 
RESIDENTIAL ATTAINMENT 24 (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Northwestern Journal of Law and 
Social Policy).
13 See Keels et al, supra note 9, at 58.  Poverty rates in Chicago’s public housing neighborhoods averaged more than 
40% but about one- half of Gautreaux One families were on the waiting list for public housing and lived in 
somewhat lower-poverty neighborhoods.  See RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 55-56.  
14 Keels et al, supra note 9, at 62.
15 Id. at 69.
16 KEELS, supra note 12, at 15.
17 Keels et al, supra note 9, at 54.
18 Id. at 61.
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none of the Gautreaux One mothers and children moved anywhere close to their original 
neighborhoods.19
Gautreaux Two began in 2002, so it is much too early to tell what long-run residential 
successes and failures these families will experience.  But the early returns are not as promising 
as the long-run results from Gautreaux One (Figure 4).20  At 13%, the average poverty rates in 
Gautreaux Two families’ placement neighborhoods were lower than those for families moving in 
conjunction with Gautreaux One, but roughly half of the Gautreaux Two families have already 
moved on, with the movers moving to neighborhoods with poverty rates that averaged 27%.
Thus, it appears that the subsequent moves are undoing some of the initial advantages of 
the original moves.  This is true with respect to race as well (Figure 5).21  On average, Gautreaux 
Two families came from communities in which 80% of their neighbors were African American 
and were placed in neighborhoods in which 11% of their neighbors were African American.  But 
those moving again have moved to neighborhoods averaging 61% African American.  All in all, 
it appears that the persistence of the residential success enjoyed by Gautreaux One families may 
not hold for Gautreaux Two families.
MTO results. The MTO evaluation gathered far more extensive information about the 
personal characteristics of family members than Gautreaux One researchers have been able to 
measure about families participating in its program. MTO experimental and control-group 
families were tracked for five years and then questioned extensively about their personal, family 
and neighborhood situation. Although control families were not given assistance in moving to 
                                                
19 Id. at 60; see also KEELS, supra note 12.
20 All of the data on Gautreaux Two mobility rates and neighborhood characteristics presented here were calculated 
by Micere Keels using program records and census tract information.
21 See supra note 20.
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low-poverty neighborhoods, many of them did move. Given their interest in this program, it is 
hardly surprising that most control families moved to somewhat better neighborhoods, but their 
new neighborhoods had far higher poverty rates than the placement neighborhoods of the MTO 
families that moved in conjunction with the program.  Neighborhood safety improved as well for 
the experimental group.22
The most striking successes for MTO were in its inventory of mental health measures.23  
Considerably fewer MTO mothers were depressed than control mothers.24  The reduction in 
depression was similar in magnitude to what has been observed in clinical studies testing best-
practice depression treatment regimens.25  This substantial improvement in mental health is not 
so surprising given what these families sought with the MTO program in the first place.  Almost 
all families enrolling in MTO reported that their primary motivation in signing up for the 
program was moving away from violent, gang-ridden neighborhoods to safer ones.26 Moving to 
neighborhoods with less crime and violence, which satisfies families’ major program desires, is 
likely linked to the striking improvements in mental health.27  Thus, by the criteria of what 
mattered most to the participants themselves, MTO was very successful.  
MTO was much less successful in promoting self-sufficiency.  Program designers hoped 
that MTO moves would improve mothers’ employment prospects, reduce their welfare 
                                                
22 ORR ET AL, supra note 3, at ix.
23ORR ET AL, supra note 3, at x; see also Jeffrey R. Kling et al, Moving To Opportunity and Tranquility: 
Neighborhood Effects on Adult Economic Self-Sufficiency and Health from a Randomized Housing Voucher 
Experiment (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. RWP04-035, 2004). 
24 Kling et al, supra note 23, at 20. 
25 Id.
26 ORR ET AL, supra note 3, at ix.; see also Jeffrey R. Kling et al, Bullets Don’t Got No Name: Consequences of 
Fear in the Ghetto, in DISCOVERING SUCCESSFUL PATHWAYS IN CHILDREN’S DEVELOPMENT: MIXED METHODS IN 
THE STUDY OF CHILDHOOD AND FAMILY LIFE (Thomas S. Weisner ed., 2005). 
27 See Kling et al, supra note 26, at 15.
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dependence, and boost the school achievement of children.28  On these counts, the results have 
been disappointing.29  MTO families were no more likely to be employed, earned no more and 
received welfare no less often than families assigned to the control group.30  Here it is important 
to remember that MTO’s evaluation took place in the late 1990s, in the midst of welfare reform 
and a booming economy.31  MTO families did indeed boost their employment and reduced their 
reliance on welfare,32 but these changes were no different, on average, from those experienced 
by the comparison group.
Early evidence from Gautreaux One conducted by James Rosenbaum and his colleagues 
compared maternal employment rates for city and suburban movers and found substantial 
differences.33  But our longer run look at employment and welfare receipt, drawing on data from 
the late 1990s, showed no employment advantages to being offered housing in a suburban as 
opposed to a city neighborhood.34  Mendenhall et al. (forthcoming) demonstrate the importance 
of a finer-grain distinction among types of placement neighborhoods, with the lowest maternal 
earnings associated with placement neighborhoods with fewer whites and less favorable 
employment and welfare outcomes for the one-fifth of families placed in high poverty, largely 
African American neighborhoods.35  Overall, the most recent evidence from MTO and 
                                                
28 ORR ET AL, supra note 3, at xi.
29 Id. at xii-xiii; Kling et al, supra note 23, at 27-28; see also Jeffrey R. Kling & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Experimental 
Analysis of Neighborhood Effects on Youth (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 483, 2004).
30 ORR ET AL, supra note 3, at xii-xiii; Kling et al, supra note 23, at 27-28; see also Kling & Liebman, supra note 29. 
31 ORR ET AL, supra note 3, at xi.
32Id. at xiii; see also Kling et al, supra note 23, at 15-19.
33 Rosenbaum & Popkin, supra note 8, at 356; Susan J. Popkin, James E. Rosenbaum & Pamela M. Meaden, Labor 
Market Experiences of Low-Income Black Women in Middle-Class Suburbs: Evidence from a Survey of Gautreaux 
Program Participants, 12(3) J. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 556 (1993).
34 Mendenhall et al, supra note 9.
35 Id.
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Gautreaux One does not replicate the dramatic employment differences observed in the original 
Gautreaux research.
Also disappointing, and this is also better established in MTO than Gautreaux, is that 
moves to better neighborhoods did not boost children’s school achievement.36  Part of the reason 
is that MTO-related moves improved neighborhood quality much more than school quality.  
Families that moved in conjunction with the program did not always attend a local school; all 
five MTO cities had citywide school districts with school choice programs.  Despite the greater 
distance, some MTO families stuck with their familiar original schools.37  Others appeared to 
pick schools that were close to relatives who might provide after-school care.38  Whatever the 
reason, it is clear from the experiment that there was essentially no impact of MTO moves on 
school achievement.  Even younger children, who were preschoolers when they moved in 
conjunction with the program, did not improve their school achievement relative to their control-
group counterparts.39  In the case of delinquent behavior, MTO appeared to benefit girls 
modestly.40 In contrast, it increased delinquent behavior on the part of boys in families that 
moved as part of MTO compared with boys in the control group.41  
Summary and conclusion.  Drawing policy implications from Gautreaux One and MTO 
requires us to weigh the considerable successes with the disappointments.  In terms of why 
                                                
36 Lisa Sanbonmatsu et al, Neighborhoods and Academic Achievement: Results from the Moving to Opportunity 
Program i (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11909, 2006).
37 SUSAN J. POPKIN ET AL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., FAMILIES IN TRANSITION: A QUALITATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF THE MTO EXPERIENCE 92 (2002).
38 Id. at 80.
39 Sanbonmatsu et al, supra note 36, at 27.
40 See Jeffrey R. Kling et al, Neighborhood Effects on Crime for Female and Male Youth: Evidence from a 
Randomized Housing Voucher Experiment, 120 THE Q. J. OF ECON. 87, 105-127 (Feb. 2004).
41 Id.; Kling & Liebman, supra note 29, at i; Susan Clampet-Lundquist et al, Moving At-Risk Kids to Better 
Neighborhoods: Why Girls Fare Better Than Boys (Princeton Indus. Relation Section, Working Paper No. 509, 
2006).
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participants were interested in the program, both programs succeeded admirably.  Families 
successfully fled their violent, gang-ridden neighborhoods, and their mental health improved.  
But in terms of what many policy makers were hoping for – more work and earnings, greater 
independence from welfare, second-generation successes – the programs were not as successful.  
Merely changing neighborhoods, even changing to much better neighborhoods, does not produce 
the kind of achievement-oriented successes in either generation that many had hoped for, 
although Gautreaux One children were able to sustain the residential successes of their mothers.
Perhaps mobility programs need to go beyond merely placing families in better 
neighborhoods and provide them with needed family and personal services and supports.  But 
here it makes sense to think more broadly, since low-income families involved in mobility 
programs are not the only ones in need of these kinds of family-based supports.
An example of such a broader program is a Milwaukee-based work support program 
called New Hope, which helps families making the transition from welfare to work.42  Workers 
who documented thirty or more hours of work were provided with a package of benefits that 
included an income supplement that brought family income above the poverty line, a childcare 
subsidy, health insurance, and a temporary community service job if people needed it to make 
their thirty hours.43  New Hope provided a package of supports that made it possible for families, 
through full time work, to balance the kind of work and family demands that all families face.  
The New Hope package of supports would undoubtedly have helped many Gautreaux and MTO 
families, as well as many other low-income families.
                                                
42 Johannes Bos et al,  New Hope for People with Low Incomes Two-Year Results of a Program to Reduce Poverty 
and Reform Welfare (1999), http://www.mdrc.org/publications/60/execsum.html; Aletha C. Huston et al, New Hope 
for Families and Children Five-Year Results of a Program to Reduce Poverty and Reform Welfare (2003), 
http://www.mdrc.org/publications/345/overview.html.
43 Bos et al, supra note 42.
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An important policy issue addressed in neither Gautreaux nor MTO research is their 
impact on receiving neighborhoods.  Designers of both programs worried that individuals living 
in the receiving neighborhoods might be subjected to higher crime rates and/or lower property 
values.  On the other hand, there might be potential spillover benefits to these moves if, for 
example, moving minority families into white neighborhoods helps promotes racial tolerance and 
understanding. 
As we think about these three different programs – Gautreaux One, MTO and Gautreaux 
Two – we need to be mindful of cohort and housing market differences. Can the residential 
successes of Gautreaux One be realized today?  Families moving in conjunction with Gautreaux 
One faced very different circumstances than families moving in conjunction with MTO and 
Gautreaux Two.  Most Gautreaux One families were first or second generation residents of 
Chicago public housing; qualitative interviews document that most of them came from two-
parent families.  These backgrounds are considerably more favorable than those of families 
participating MTO and Gautreaux Two.  Moreover, housing markets were different for the three 
groups, with many more apartments rented to Section 8 tenants during the eras of MTO and 
Gautreaux Two moves than when most Gautreaux One moves took place.  Indeed, there is 
evidence that some apartment buildings in otherwise middle-class neighborhoods filled almost 
completely with Section 8 tenants.44  It would be a hollow victory if the demolition of Chicago’s 
public housing led to its re-creation in the private housing market. 
At the same time, it is crucial to realize the formidable opportunities provided by the 
residential mobility that follows on the heels of neighborhood revitalization efforts. Gautreaux 
                                                
44 David P. Varady & Carole C. Walker, Vouchering Out Distressed Subsidized Developments: Does Moving Lead 
to Improvements in Housing and Neighborhood Conditions?, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 115, 138 n.30 (2000).
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One proves that families – both adults and their children – placed in affluent, integrated and 
much safer neighborhoods are able to build new lives for themselves and maintain these 
residential successes.  MTO and early results from Gaureaux Two suggest that neighborhood 
changes may be necessary but not sufficient conditions for improvement; many families in these 
more recent programs appear to need other supports in order to be truly successful.
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